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Comments
The Effect Of A Petition For
Decertification On The Bargaining
Process: The Reversal Of Dresser
Industries
In Dresser Industries, the National Labor Relations Board held
that an employee-filed petition for decertification does not permit
an employer to refuse to bargain with the incumbent union. This
Comment submits that the National Labor Relations Board
should return to the rule that Dresser Industries expressly over-
ruled. This Comment argues that the Telautograph Corporation
rule requiring an employer to refuse to bargain, is the more work-
able and practical of the two conflicting rules and is more likely to
achieve the legislative goals of the National Labor Relations Act.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1982, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)1 has
given effect to a confusing and chaotic rule regarding the effect
decertification petitions have on the bargaining process. Dresser In-
dustries2 held that the mere filing of a decertification petition would
no longer require or permit an employer to cease bargaining or exe-
cuting a contract with an incumbent union.- For the prior ten years,
the NLRB had adhered to the rule, set forth in Telautograph Cor-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
2. 264 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982).
3. Id. at 1089.
poration,4 that an employer presented with a decertification petition,
could refuse to bargain with a union concerning a new contract
pending the NLRB's resolution of the question concerning
representation.5
This Comment asserts that the application of the Dresser holding
is both unworkable and impractical. The decision has failed to attain
its desired goal of giving due weight to the incumbent union's contin-
uing presumption of majority status, in order to best achieve em-
ployer neutrality in the upcoming decertification election. 6 Indeed,
Dresser has transformed the period of time between the employer's
discovery of the filing of the decertification petition and the actual
election into a period of chaos. As a result, relations between man-
agement and labor are more strained and bargaining is even more
strident than ever.
This Comment will compare and contrast Telautograph with
Dresser in order to illustrate the effects Dresser has on the bargain-
ing process once a petition for decertification has been filed. Ulti-
mately, this Comment will demonstrate that Telautograph provides
the better rule because it effectuates the national policy as set forth
in the National Labor Relations Act. Consequently, the NLRB
should reconsider its present policy, reverse Dresser, and reinstate its
prior Telautograph holding.
BACKGROUND
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7 has declared rules
and policy designed to specifically and efficiently regulate collective
bargaining' and to stimulate the national economy by promoting in-
dustrial stabilization and eliminating industrial strife.9 Further, the
goal of the NLRA is to ensure that employers and their employees
4. 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).
5. Id. at 892.
6. Dresser Industries, 264 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982):
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and desig-
nation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3 Internal Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797 (1945).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 1.01 (1987).
Any labor-management disruption is seen as making the vindication of these policies
impossible. Id. at 1-1.
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can interact together in the absence of substantive governmental reg-
ulation to establish mutually satisfactory working and contractual
conditions.10 Moreover, the NLRA is designed to channel the pas-
sions, arguments, and struggles of prior years into constructive open
discussions leading to a mutually satisfactory agreement between the
employer and the employees,1 the maintenance of full production of
goods in the national economy, and a normal free flow of
commerce.
1 2
As a matter of public policy, workers have a statutory right to join
unions and bargain collectively. 3 This right is protected by providing
a governmentally supervised election procedure through which they
can select a representing union.1 4 Furthermore, certain "unfair labor
practices,"1 5 which serve to undermine the basic objectives of the
NLRA,18 are forbidden.
It is the sole function of the NLRB to give effect to the declared
purpose of Congress in enacting the NLRA.'7 More specifically, the
NLRB supervises representation elections, and investigates and adju-
dicates charges of unfair labor practices.1 8 Further, since the NLRB
has a special understanding of the realities of industrial relations, its
primary function and responsibility is to carefully appraise the inter-
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see also N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) stating that the duty to bargain in good faith is an
"obligation . . . to participate actively in the deliberations so as to indictate a present
intention to find a basis for agreement . . . ." This implies both "an open mind and a
sincere desire to reach an agreement" as well as a "sincere effort. . . to reach common
ground." Id. at 686; Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1304, 1304-05
(1964). The totality of the circumstances is considered to determine if bargaining was
conducted in good faith.
II. H.K. Porter v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
12. T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 5.02(3), at 5-112 (1987).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); N.L.R.B. v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1970).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982) provides rules and regulations regarding election
procedures.
15. R. FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 1 (1987).
The unfair labor practices are enumerated in § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
16. The basic objectives of the NLRA are stated in 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (it is
within the public interest to discourage and prevent unfair labor practices). See also
National Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 362-63 (1940); N.L.R.B. v. Great W.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 740 F.2d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 1984).
17. N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953); N.L.R.B. v.
Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 145 (1971).
18. R. FLANAGAN, supra note 15, at 1. See F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
289 (1950). "The public interest in discouraging obstacles to industrial peace requires
that [the NLRB] seek to bring about in unfair labor practice cases, 'a restoration of the
situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal
discrimination.'" Id. at 292-93.
ests of both sides of a labor-management controversy in the diverse
circumstances of individual cases, and to apply the provisions of the
NLRA. 19
The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with a union supported by
the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. 20 If
a union possesses the requisite support, it is certified by the NLRB
as the official bargaining representative of the workers.21
Once a union is certified, an employer is strictly prohibited from
refusing to bargain in two major instances: 1) for one year following
the date of certification22; and 2) during the period that a collective
bargaining agreement is in effect.23 At these times, the union's ma-
19. N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1958); see also East Bay
Union of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 322 F.2d 411,414 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Burger, J.) ("The
use of this languagewas a reflection of the congressional awareness that the [NLRA]
covered a wide variety of industrial and commercial activity and a recognition that col-
lective bargaining must be kept flexible without a precise delineation of what subjects
were covered so that the [NLRA] could be administered to meet changing conditions."),
affd sub. nom. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 441 U.S. 488 (1979). It is a conscious decision by Congress
that the NLRB mark "out the scope of the statutory language [of the NLRA] and of the
statutory duty to bargain." Id. at 496.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states that "it shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Section 8(a)(2) states that if an
employer "dominate[s] or interfere[s] with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute[s] financial or other support to it" then it is an unfair labor
practice. Section 8(a)(5) states that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." (29 U.S.C. § 159(a)). Section 8(d) defines "to bargain collec-
tively" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Section 9(a) pro-
vides that "representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit .... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982).
22. Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951). The NLRB noted
the practical effects of this as:
1) that the fact of the union's majority during the certification year is estab-
lished by the certificate, without more, and can be rebutted only by a showing
of unusual circumstances; and 2) that during the certification year an employer
cannot, absent unusual circumstances, lawfully predicate a refusal to bargain
upon a doubt as to the union's majority even though that doubt is raised in
good faith.
Id. at 672.
23. Pioneer Inn Ass'n. v. N.L.R.B., 578 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1978), enforcing
228 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1977); see also Confectionary and Tobacco Drivers v. N.L.R.B.,
312 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1961) (suggesting that the purpose of the contract-bar rule was to protect the bargaining
atmosphere regardless of whether a majority of employees withdraw their support).
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jority status is presumed to be irrebuttable.24 Therefore, an em-
ployer's refusal to bargain for any reason absent unusual circum-
stances, is a per se violation of the NLRA. 5
The presumption of the union's majority status becomes rebutta-
ble once a majority union's certification year has ended or the life of
a collective bargaining agreement has expired. 6 An employer may
refuse to bargain with the union if it affirmatively establishes that:
1) it has a reasonable "good-faith doubt" as to the union's continued
majority status;27 or 2) at the time of its refusal, the union no longer
enjoys representative majority status.28
To sustain an employer's claim of a good faith defense for failure
to collectively bargain, two prerequisites are required. The asserted
good-faith doubt, must be based on objective considerations 29 that
are clear, cogent and convincing. 30 Further, any challenge must be
raised in an atmosphere free of any unfair labor practices. 31 This
criterion sanctions employer conduct aimed at causing disaffection
toward the union or indicating that, while raising the majority issue,
the employer was merely seeking to gain time in which to undermine
the union.32
The recent trend of the NLRB has been to make an employer's
burden so heavy that the employer must substantially prove that the
union lacks majority status.33 To satisfy this high-threshold burden,
24. Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
25. West Fork Cut Glass Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 944 (1950).
26. Pennco Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980), enforced, N.L.R.B. v. Pennco, Inc.,
684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982). The presumption of
continued majority status promotes continuity in bargaining relationships and protects
the express statutory right of employees to choose their own representative and to prevent
an employer from impairing that right without objective evidence that the representative
no longer enjoys majority support. Id. at 716-17; N.L.R.B. v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327,
1330-31 (3rd Cir. 1970), enforcing, 175 N.L.R.B. 233 (1969); McDermott & Co., Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 571 F.2d 850, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978);
Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951).
27. Terrell, 173 N.L.R.B. at 1480-81; Celanese, 95 N.L.R.B. at 672-73.
28. Terrell, 173 N.L.R.B. at 1480-81; Retired Persons Pharmacy v. N.L.R.B.,
519 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975), enforcing, 210 N.L.R.B. 443 (1974); Allied Industries
Workers v. N.L.R.B., 476 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1973), enforcing, 192 N.L.R.B. 290
(1971).
29. Terrell, 173 N.L.R.B. at 1480-81.
30. Nazareth Literary and Benevolent Inst., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 10, slip op.
at 6 (Nov. 7, 1986); N.L.R.B. v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1972);
N.L.R.B. v. Tripilett, 619 F.2d 586, 587 (6th Cir. 1980).
31. Firestone Synthetic Rubber and Latex Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1179, 1180 (1968).
32. Colonial Manor Convalescent and Nursing Center, 188 N.L.R.B. 861 (1971).
33. Pennco Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, 717 (1980). See Comment, Application of
an employer typically relies on such objective considerations as dec-
larations by employees that they are dissatisfied with the union, de-
clining percentage of employees authorizing dues checkoffs, a high
percentage of employee turnover, abortive strike actions, union re-
fusal to process grievances, and poor attendance at union meetings.3 4
Additionally, it is clear that "subjective evidence may also be used to
bolster the argument" that doubt concerning the union's majority
status existed at the time of an employer's refusal to bargain.35 How-
ever, management's good faith doubt may not be founded only on its
subjective state of mind, but rather, must be grounded firmly on ob-
jective considerations.36
Such a weighty burden in favor of a continued union majority is
necessary to fulfill fundamental policies of federal labor law. These
policies include the promotion of continuity in bargaining relation-
ships,3 7 and the protection of the express statutory right of employ-
ees to designate a collective bargaining representative of their own
choosing.38 The purpose of these policies is to form a foundation to
support the NLRA's primary objective of industrial stability. 9
In determining whether an employer has questioned a union's ma-
jority status in good faith, the NLRB must perform an analysis on a
case by case basis, taking into consideration the totality of the cir-
cumstances.40 Because the standard of good faith involves a highly
the Good Faith-Doubt Test to the Presumption of Continued Majority Status of Incum-
bent Unions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 718; R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 114 (1976).
34. Krupman & Rasin, Decertification: Removing the Shroud, 30 LAB. L.J. 231,
238 (1979); see, e.g., Automated Business Sys. v. N.L.R.B., 497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.
1974); Nat'l Cash Register Co. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974); Roman Iron
Works, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 101, slip op. at 14 (Jan. 14, 1987); Cowles Publishing Co., 280
N.L.R.B. No. 105 (June 24, 1986); cf., Star Forge, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 536 F.2d 1192 (7th
Cir. 1976) and Royal Typewriter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976) with
Teamsters Local 769 v. N.L.R.B., 532 F.2d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and United Super-
markets, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 958 (1974) to illustrate the use of objective considerations
to meet management's burden; see generally, C. MORRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
542-49 (1983 & Supp. 1985) for a survey of which objective considerations are deter-
mined to be sufficient and insufficient to withdraw union recognition; see also id. at 655-
60 and cases cited therein.
35. N.L.R.B. v. Triplett, 619 F.2d 586, 587 (6th Cir. 1980); N.L.R.B. v. Vegas
Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. N.L.R.B. v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966), enforcing,
147 N.L.R.B. 997 (1964); McDermott & Co., 571 F.2d at 859 ("It is insufficient...
that the employer merely intuits nonsupport.").
37. Pennco, 250 N.L.R.B. at 717; N.L.R.B. v. Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140
F.2d 541, 542; enforcing, 47 N.L.R.B. 835 (1943). This is because "inherent in any
successful administration of such a system is some measure of permanence in the re-
sults." Id. at 542.
38. Pennco, 250 N.L.R.B. at 717.
39. N.L.R.B. v. Brooks, 204 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1953), enforcing, 98 N.L.R.B.
976 (1952), affd, Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
40. Taylor Hospital, 279 N.L.R.B. No. 6, slip op. at 9-10 (March 31, 1986);
Celanese, 95 N.L.R.B. at 673; Ingress-Plastene, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 430 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.
1970). "Although the Board attacks each of the reasons [(objective considerations)] ad-
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subjective determination by the tribunal,41 an unavoidable problem
that arises in a case by case application of a subjective good faith
standard is the uncertainty of what is reasonably expected from an
employer. The NLRB and the federal courts have agreed that the
obligation to deal in good faith with the union entails sincerity and a
desire to reach an agreement.42 However, it is difficult to translate
this standard into a plan of action that an employer can follow to
avoid committing any unfair labor practices.43 Such is the case when
the employer is aware that the NLRB has been presented with a
petition for decertification filed by the employees.
DECERTIFICATION PETITIONS FILED By EMPLOYEES
A Question Concerning Representation
The NLRA provides that a decertification petition may be submit-
ted to a Regional Office of the NLRB in an attempt to terminate the
incumbent union's status as bargaining representative.44 Decertifica-
tion petitions normally are not accepted by the NLRB until: 1) one
year from the date of certification (certification year rule); 2) a rea-
sonable period following recognition (recognition rule); 3) 60 days
prior to the anniversary of a previous election (twelve month rule);
and 4) between 90 and 60 days prior to the termination date of a
vanced by the company in support of its good faith doubt of the union's majority status,
the company does not rely on any one reason alone but rather on all as a whole." Id. at
546-47.
41. F. BARTOSIC & C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SEC-
TOR 284 (1986).
42. Id.
43. Burkart Foam, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 9 (March 26, 1987).
(The loss of majority cannot be due to the employer's unfair labor practices.) See also
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944); Frank Bros. Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 704-05 (1944); N.L.R.B. v. Little Rock Downtowner Inc., 414
F.2d 1084, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1969).
44. Section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides that:
[W]henver a petition shall have been filled ... by an employee or group of
employees or any individual or labor organizaton acting in their behalf alleging
that a substantial number of employees . . . assert that the individual or labor
organization, which has been certified or is currently being recognized by their
employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative ...
the [NLRB] shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to
believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall pro-
vide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice .... If the [NLRB] finds
upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it
shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1982). This is referred to as a RD petition. Also, an em-
ployer may file an RM petition to achieve the same purposes under 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1)(B). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) defines "employee."
contract with a definite expiration date of three years or less; for
contracts with a definite expiration date of more than three years,
between 90 and 60 days prior to the contract's third year, or after
the contract's third year anniversary date ("contract bar" rule). 5
If the NLRB accepts the filed petition and deems that a question
concerning representation exists, 6 it directs that a decertification
election be held within the bargaining unit.47 The results of that
election are subsequently certified by the NLRB and become offi-
cial.48 The union remains the established bargaining representative
until the results are certified even if it loses the election. 49 To prevent
the interjection of instability and uncertainty into the bargaining re-
lationship, the results of the election are not effective until official
NLRB certification. This serves to maintain the status quo while the
employee's choice of representation is in doubt.50
Traditionally, a valid RD petition for decertification 51 filed by an
employee of the incumbent union, with a minimum showing of inter-
est of 30%,52 has presented an employer with objective criteria
which helps to raise a good faith doubt as to a union's continuing
majority status.53 Current law in this area is derived from the line of
cases containing representation petitions filed by rival unions. In
Midwest Piping,54 the NLRB first held that an employer, faced with
competing claims of which of the two or more rival unions should
45. F. COLEMAN, THE DEUNIONIZING HANDBOOK 25 (1983).
46. C. MORRIS, supra note 34. "A question concerning representation (often re-
ferred to as a QCR) exists when a labor organization or individual seeks recognition as
bargaining agent and the employer declines to recognize it, thus requiring the Board to
determine whether the union or the individual represents a majority of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit." Id. at 341.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982). The bargaining unit consists of that portion of
workers that the union represents. Usually, it is a subset of the entire population at the
workplace. See generally, H. HUSBAND, JR., MANAGEMENT FACES UNIONIZATION 77-98
(1969). (Primarily the appropriateness of a unit is determined by the common interests
of the group involved, i.e., a "community of interest" which demonstrates a similarity of
working conditions and supervision within the context of the company's organizational
structure.). The Board determines the "appropriate bargaining unit and which employees
will be placed in it, who will therefore vote in the election." Id. at 77; C. MORRIS, supra
note 34, at 413-21.
48. Id.
49. Albert Van Luit & Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1087 (1978); Dow Chemical Co., 250
N.L.R.B. 756 (1980), enforced, 660 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. Presbyterian Hospitals in the City of New York, 241 N.L.R.B. 996, 998
(1979); Trico Products Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 (1978) (election results are not
always determinative because of objections and rerun elections).
51. A RD petition is a decertification petition that is filed by an employee, a
group of employees, or an individual or organization acting on their behalf.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1982). Since § 9(c)(1)(A) requires that a "substantial
number of employees" support the petition, substantial has been defined as 30%.
53. C. MORRIS, supra note 34.
54. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); The Midwest Piping doctrine is discussed exten-
sively in Kesselring & Brinker, Contract Difficulties Under § 8(a)(2), 31 LAB. L.J. 139
(1980).
588
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initially represent the employees, must maintain strict neutrality.5 5 It
was deemed an unfair labor practice to recognize one of the compet-
ing unions after a representation question had been submitted to the
NLRB by the filing of a petition.56 That two or more prospective
unions vied to represent the bargaining unit demonstrated to the
NLRB that a question concerning representation existed.57 This ex-
plicit decree requiring strict neutrality made it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to recognize either one of the rival unions after
this question concerning representation had been submitted. The
NLRB held it was not a violation to refuse to bargain with any of
the unions.58
The doctrine of strict neutrality was extended in Shea Chemical
Corp.59 to instances where an incumbent union is present and a rival
union filed a decertification petition. The NLRB held that an em-
ployer, in the interest of neutrality, may not bargain collectively with
the incumbent union until the question of representation had been
settled by the NLRB. 0 The issue arises when at least 30 % of the
workers in the bargaining unit show an interest in the competing
union."' Under the Shea rule, not only must an employer refuse to
bargain, but he is necessarily prohibited from doing so. To do other-
wise, would be a violation of the NLRA. 2 The employee's right to
freedom of choice of representation is thus preserved and protected
because the employee is sheltered from unfair employer interference.
Later cases suggested an expansion of this rule from requiring the
55. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1070; The Midwest Piping doctrine has been well accepted by
the NLRB. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Vanella Buick Opel, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 744 (1971),
enforced, 475 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); Captive Plastics, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 749
(1974); Shreveport Packing Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 498 (1972); Belleville News Democrat,
Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 431 (1972); Mosler Safe Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 71 (1974).
56. Id.
57. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1070.
58. Id. at 1070-71.
59. 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958). Shea overruled William D. Gibson, 110 N.L.R.B.
660 (1954), accord, William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1951) which
narrowed the Midwest Piping doctrine proclaiming that an employer was permitted to
bargain with the incumbent union while the rival union's petition was pending.
60. Shea, 121 N.L.R.B. at 1029.
61. Id. at 1029; Swift & Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 732 (1960) (a competing union must
file a petition and the NLRB must administratively determine there is a showing of in-
terest by taking cognizance of the case for a real question concerning representation to
exist). 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 has determined that 30% represents a sufficient showing of
support.
62. Id. Specifically, the employer is likely to commit an unfair labor practice
under § 8(a) of the NLRA. However, the Midwest Piping doctrine does not apply in
situations when, because of contract bar or certification year or other established reason,
the rival claim does not raise a real representation question. Shea, 121 N.L.R.B. at 1027.
30% show of interest to simply requiring that the claim of the rival
union not be clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance.63 Until
NLRB resolution, if there was a colorable claim to representation by
another union, an employer must refuse to bargain even if no repre-
sentation petition has been filed.6 This expansion suggested that the
NLRB was willing to find worthy representation questions whenever
possible. As long as the issue was genuine and the employer main-
tained neutrality, the employer was permitted to refuse to bargain.
Telautograph Corporation
In 1972, the NLRB again saw fit to logically expand the Shea
doctrine to instances where a real question concerning representation
has been raised by the timely filing of a decertification petition by
employees of the incumbent union.6 5
In Telautograph, the incumbent union duly notified management
two days after the existing agreement ended that it desired to termi-
nate that agreement and begin bargaining for a new agreement.66
Management's representative responded with a suggested meeting
date. 7 In the interim, an employee of the bargaining unit filed an
RD decertification petition. The NLRB determined that a question
concerning representation existed and directed that an election be
held.68 Management refused to bargain collectively with the chal-
lenged union which then filed an unfair labor practice charge,
thereby "blocking" the election.6
The NLRB, after reviewing the current standard line of applicable
cases for good faith and objective considerations,"0 agreed that nor-
mally an employer's refusal to bargain must be based on objective
evidence in addition to the filing of the decertification petition. How-
ever, because there was an absence of unremedied employer unfair
labor practices, the NLRB distinguished the present case as falling
squarely within special circumstances.7 1 Therefore, the NLRB held
63. Playskool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972) (the NLRB claimed that it had
"never established any numerical percentage as a condition precedent to establishing the
existence of a question concerning representation."), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66
(7th Cir. 1973), supplemented, 205 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1973); The Boys' Markets Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 105 (1965), enforced sub nom, Retail Clerks Local 777 v. N.L.R.B. 370 F.2d
205 (9th Cir. 1966); accord, U & I, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1 (1976); American Can Co.,
218 N.L.R.B. 102 (1975), enforced, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976).
64. American Can Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 102 (1975), enforced, 535 F.2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1976) (An employer could not recognize or contract with any union until the repre-
sentation question was settled by the Board).
65. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).




70. Id. (cases cited therein).
71. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. at 893.
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that when a petition for decertification is timely filed by an employee
and raises a question concerning representation, an employer need
not demonstrate any additional objective considerations of good faith
doubt. 2 The employer may refuse to bargain as long as it has not
engaged in any anti-union activities that would taint the atmosphere
for an upcoming election. 3
It is crucial that a genuine representation question. exist; other-
wise, the requirements set forth in the Telautograph holding are not
met. Consequently, the Telautograph rule is not applicable if: the
petition was dismissed;74 the contract bar was in effect;75 the certifi-
cation had not expired; there was inadequate showing of interest; the
employees signed the petition because they were compelled to do so
by the employer's unlawful acts;78 the employer is relying on its own
decertification petition;77 the employer was unaware of the filing of
the petition;78 or if the employees strike.79
The Telautograph doctrine is relatively easy to apply.8 0 Concrete
guidelines on bargaining remove much of the subjective uncertainty
encountered by employers when attempting to determine if sufficient
objective considerations exist. Employers who in good faith want to
abide by the rules and objectives of the NLRA are now able to
gauge their actions so that they are consciously and knowingly able
72. Id. at 894.
73. Id. It does not matter if the employees were aware of the unfair labor prac-
tices or not, or if they provided the impetus for the filing of the decertification petition.
N.L.R.B. v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1981). The existence of unfair labor prac-
tices prior to the refusal to bargain interjects an element of uncertainty about whether
the employer caused the possible loss of majority. Nat'l Cash v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 189
(8th Cir. 1974).
74. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 763 (1978).
75. Sahra-Tahoe Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 648 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1980); Telauto-
graph, 199 N.L.R.B. at 892.
76. Greyhound Airport Serv., Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 900 (1973); Warehouse Mkt.,
Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 216 (1975); Antoninos' Restaurant, 246 N.L.R.B. 833 (1979); Provi-
dence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. 714 (1979); Autoprod Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 773
(1976).
77. N.L.R.B. v. Anderson, 611 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1979); N.L.R.B. v. Top Mfg.,
594 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1979); N.T. Enloe Memorial Hospital v. N.L.R.B., 682 F.2d 790
(11th Cir. 1982), enforcing, 250 N.L.R.B. 583 (1980).
78. Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 895 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1978).
79. N.L.R.B. v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 U.S. 346, 351 (4th Cir. 1962) (there is
no question concerning representation when employees strike).
80. In Traub's Mkt., Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 787, 789-90 (1973), chairman Miller
clarified the Telautograph doctrine as simplistically as possible. An employer's "privilege
- and his duty - as set forth in Shea Chemical - is now clear and unmistakable. He
may - and must - discontinue negotiations until the question concerning representa-
tion is resolved through orderly election processes."
to avoid violating the NLRA. As the NLRB indicates, it is "this
critical factor - i.e., the absence of unremedied unfair labor prac-
tices - that distinguishes this case from those [cases]" 81 where ad-
ditional objective considerations were required to allow the employer
to refuse to bargain. Therefore, at the time the decertification peti-
tion is filed, if employers have a "bright-line" test to follow, then
presumably they will know how to properly act during this sensitive
period.
Assuming a proper question concerning representation exists as a
prerequisite, if an unfair labor practice charge is pending against the
employer, then the employer will know that the Telautograph doc-
trine does not apply, and the employer must continue to bargain with
the incumbent union.82 However, if an employer has no unfair labor
practice violations, it can refuse to bargain. Thus, the' employer can
remain neutral until the NLRB has resolved the issue as to the ma-
jority support of the union. Telautograph ostensibly discards the pre-
vious balancing test propagated by Midwest Piping and Shea for
good faith and objective considerations when there are no unfair la-
bor practices. Telautograph instead, chooses a rule designed to pre-
serve employer neutrality, employee free choice of representation,
and industrial stability.
Post-Telautograph Corporation
The period following the NLRB's decision in Telautograph was
marked by conflict. Although the NLRB appeared administratively
satisfied with the rule, the federal courts of appeal struggled with its
enforcement.8 3 The federal courts were already hostile to the Mid-
81. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. at 894; see also Traub's Mkt., 205 N.L.R.B. at
787; The Drackett Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 447, 451 (1973); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Ca, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 540, 546-47 (1975); Helvetia Sugar Coop., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B.
638, 640 (1978); Vernon Mfg. Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 285 (1974).
82. See, e.g., Antonino's Restaurant, 246 N.L.R.B. 833 (1974), enforced sub
nom, N.L.R.B. v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1981); N.L.R.B. v. Sky Wolf Sales,
470 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1972); N.L.R.B. v. Union Carbide Cribe, Inc., 423 F.2d 231 (Ist
Cir. 1970); N.L.R.B. v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 449 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1971); but see,
N.L.R.B. v. Nu-Southern Dyeing & Finishing, Inc., 444 F.2d 11, 16 (4th Cir. 1971)(where unfair labor practice violations "prior to the refusal to bargain [do] not necessa-
rily mean that an employer's action is in bad faith. An employer may avoid a bargaining
order by showing that the unfair labor practices did not significantly contribute to such a
loss of majority. . . ."). See also Freemont Newspapers, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 436 F.2d 665
(8th Cir. 1970).
83. See, e.g., Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 895 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1978); N.L.R.B. v. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 628 F.2d 1, 5 n.1(D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the Telautograph rule does not apply to the facts of the
case while indicating its reluctance to follow such a rule); Walker Die Casting, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 682 F.2d 592, 594 (6th Cir. 1982); Rogers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 486 F.2d
644, 647 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937 (1974); Allied Indus. Workers v.
N.L.R.B., 476 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Retired Persons Pharmacy v. N.L.R.B., 519
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975).
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west Piping doctrine, which provided the basic foundation of the
Telautograph rule, and, therefore, were reluctant to recognize its ex-
tension. 4 Accordingly, many federal opinions rejected Telautograph
as an insufficient basis upon which to refuse to bargain and urged
the NLRB to agree. 5 In response, the NLRB either indicated that it
would not change until the Supreme Court passed judgment on the
issue of when an employer can refuse to bargain,86 or avoided the
Midwest Piping issue altogether, by finding unlawful interference or
assistance instead.87
In 1982, the NLRB reexamined the law developed by Midwest
Piping and Shea. In Bruckner Nursing Home8 and RCA Del Car-
ibe,s9 the NLRB ruled that the mere filing of a representation peti-
tion by an outside challenging union will no longer require or even
permit an employer to withdraw from bargaining or executing a con-
tract with an incumbent union. Hence, an employer will not violate
section 8(a)(2)90 of the NLRA by post-petition negotiations or by
the execution of a contract with the incumbent union.91 Further, an
84. This proposition is evidenced most clearly in Suburban Transit Corp., 203
N.L.R.B. 465 (1973), enforced in part, 499 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1974); see also, C. MORRIS,
supra note 34, at 293 n.144 (cases cited therein). Most circuits have refused to find a
violation of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA when an employer has recognized one of two com-
peting unions which has clearly demonstrated its majority support. Id. at 293.
85. See Lammert, 229 N.L.R.B. 895; Maywood, 628 F.2d 1; Walker, 682 F.2d
592; Rogers, 486 F.2d 644; Allied Industrial, 476 F.2d 868; Retired Person Pharmacy,
519 F.2d 486.
86. Kona Surf Hotel, 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1974). This Midwest Piping case expresses the frustration of the NLRB
and its conflict with the federal circuit courts over the refusal to bargain issue because a
genuine question concerning representation exists. "[W]e respectfully disagree [with fed-
eral circuit decisions] and adhere to our view until such time as the U.S. Supreme Court
has passed on the matter. Unlike the views expressed in the conflicting court decisions,
we do not believe our decision . . . interferes with the stability of lawfully established
bargaining relationships. Rather, we believe . . . the purposes and policies of the
[NLRA] require that the issue of representation be decided by employees, in a manner
attended by the safeguards of the [NLRB's] election machinery." 201 N.L.R.B. at 142
n.12. On appeal, the court mentions that it has the "great weight of authority in the
Courts of Appeals" on its side but skirts the issue that a genuine question concerning
representation existed which demanded an election. Evidently enough employees were
dissatisfied so that a NLRB supervised election should have been mandated to resolve the
question. Yet, the court completely foreclosed this route. Kona Surf Hotel, 507 F.2d at
412-13.
87. See Atlas Lumber Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 823 (1978); B.F.G. Gourmet Foods,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 489 (1978); Lyndale Mfg. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1978).
88. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
89. RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
91. Bruckner, 262 N.L.R.B. 955; RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965.
employer would violate section 8(a)(5) 92 of the NLRA by refusing to
bargain solely because a petition had been filed by an outside
union. 3 The NLRB concluded that its past efforts to strike an ap-
propriate balance between securing employee free choice and pro-
moting stable collective bargaining relationships had unduly favored
the former.94
These decisions indicated the NLRB's movement toward stressing
the promotion of bargaining stability to a greater degree. This set
the stage for the NLRB to further retreat from its ShealTelauto-
graph posture in 1982, when the NLRB decided Dresser Industries.
Dresser Industries
In Dresser Industries,95 the NLRB, faced with a set of facts that
seemingly placed the case within the bounds of the Telautograph
doctrine, overruled the 10 year old decision in favor of a holding
similar to that found in the federal courts of appeal. In Dresser,
management bargained collectively with the union only four times in
the first ten months after its certification. Yet, the NLRB ruled that
this did not necessarily reflect bad faith bargaining by manage-
ment.9" Th NLRB noted that efforts were made to meet, but be-
cause of difficult travel schedules of each party, mutual meeting
times were often impossible to arrange.
An RD decertification petition was filed by the employees two
days before the end of the certification year.98 Approximately a week
later, management informed the union of its intent to wait until the
representation question was resolved before continuing to bargain.90
The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge for fail-
ure to bargain in good faith.100
The NLRB, citing two pre-Telautograph cases,101 stated that a
decertification petition does not provide a reasonable ground for an
employer to doubt the majority status of the union, since on its face
it represents only 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit.0 2
The NLRB, expressly overruling Telautograph, held that the mere
92. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
93. Bruckner, 262 N.L.R.B. 955; RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. 963, 965.
94. Bruckner, 262 N.L.R.B. at 957; RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965-66.
95. 264 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982).
96. Dresser, 264 N.L.R.B. at 1092.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1091.
99. Id. at 1092.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1088 n.5 (quoting Massey Ferguson, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. 640, 641
(1970)); Wabana, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1171 (1964)). These cases are distinguished
from Telautograph in that each involves an employer who is charged with unfair labor
practices.
102. Id. at 1088.
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filing of a decertification petition by incumbent union employees
would no longer require or permit an employer to withdraw from
bargaining or executing a contract with an incumbent union."0 3
In the Dresser dissent, NLRB Chairman Van De Water, who also
dissented in RCA Del Caribe,04 admonished the majority for its
shortsighted approach in its attempt to fulfill the NLRA policy of
ensuring the employee's free choice of representation. 10 5 The Chair-
man, a supporter of the established Telautograph doctrine, believed
that the majority position in Dresser would frustrate the exercise of
the employee's right to free choice of representation106 - a right
that the NLRB has a duty to guarantee in an uninfluenced atmo-
sphere. Currently, the Dresser holding continues to represent the
state of the law controlling decertification petitions.
Telautograph COMPARED AND CONTRASTED WITH Dresser
There are two basic questions that must be analyzed concerning
the bargaining process following the filing of a decertification peti-
tion. The initial inquiry focuses on the effect of the filing of a peti-
tion for decertification on the bargaining process. This Comment
then addresses a more pragmatic question: What should the desired
effects of either rule, Telautograph or Dresser, be on the bargaining
process in order to remain faithful to the goals and objectives of the
NLRA?
103. Dresser, 264 N.L.R.B. at 1089. However, the NLRB explicitly stated that it
did not intend to erode "the principle that an employer is privileged to withdraw from
bargaining if, on the basis of objective evidence, it has a good-faith doubt as to the
union's continued majority status .... We will test an employer's good-faith doubt...
by our traditional criteria, regardless of the filing of a decertification petition." Id. at
1089 n.7. In Ray, Industrial Stability and Decertification Elections: Need for Reform,
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 257, 273 (1984), Professor Ray proposes that this is in error because there
should be no instances where an employer independently and unreliably can withdraw
from bargaining. An employer should be required to await the results of the upcoming
decertification election, because the election best illustrates the wishes of the employees.
This Comment asserts differently. The realities of bargaining demonstrate that if the
employer must bargain, especially in all circumstances, there will not be a quick and
certain election because unions will seize the opportunity to delay or prevent the election
by such tactics as blocking charges. See infra note 138.
104. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965 (Van De Water, Chairman,
dissenting).
105. Dresser, 264 N.L.R.B. at 1090.
106. Id.
The Effect of Filing a Petition for Decertification on the
Bargaining Process
As previously discussed, the NLRB had advanced two lines of
cases for situations where a decertification petition has been filed by
an incumbent union employee. Telautograph and its progeny held
that the mere filing of a valid decertification petition is sufficient
cause for an employer to refuse to bargain further with the incum-
bent union."" However, the current state of the law depicted in
Dresser asserts that mere filing is NOT sufficient. An employer must
also show adequate proof of its good faith doubt of the incumbent
union's lack of continuing majority status.108
This Comment contends that Telautograph provides labor and
management with the best and most efficient rule for governing the
area of labor relations. The rule in Telautograph should be confined
to situations where an employer refuses to bargain in light of a genu-
ine question concerning representation, and not when the employer
wants to withdraw recognition entirely from the union majority rep-
resentative.' 0 9 Only in cases where an employer desires to withdraw
such recognition, should an employer be required to assert additional
good faith objective considerations as proof of its doubt.110
Additionally, under the Telautograph rule, an employer would
still be required to perform all administrative functions of an agree-
ment already in effect."' If no agreement is currently in effect, the
parties can stipulate to a temporary extension of the terms of the
previously expired agreement during the period between manage-
ment's refusal to bargain and the date of election and certification of
election results." 2 During this time, an employer is prohibited from
unilaterally changing the terms of the agreement without first con-
sulting the union," 3 so as not to impede the employee's right to free
choice and to avoid undermining the union, causing additional disaf-
fection." 4 However, the law remains uncertain as to whether an em-
ployer may change terms of agreement that do not directly affect the
107. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. 892.
108. Dresser, 264 N.L.R.B. 1088.
109. General Radiator Div., N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel Advice Memo., Case No. 14-
CA-I1754-1, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1083 (1978).
110. Id.; Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. at 893-94.
111. Nazareth Literary and Benevolent Inst., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 10, slip op. at 6
(Nov. 7, 1986); St. Louis Cordage Mills, 170 N.L.R.B. 167 (1968); see also Wayne
Metal Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 392 (1979); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
112. See, e.g., Turbodyne Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 522, 524 (1976); G & H. Towing
Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 589, 591 (1968).
113. These actions would be a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982), see supra note
20.
114. Marine World USA, 236 N.L.R.B. 89 (1978); see, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Great
W. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 740 F.2d 393, 403 (5th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Katz, 369 U.S.
236 (1962); Electric Machine Co. v. N.L.R.B., 653 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1981).
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union/employee relationship in a way that would in turn have nega-
tive consequences on the upcoming election."15
It can be argued that the Telautograph rule heavily favors an em-
ployer that can remove itself from the bargaining process. However,
in reality, the worker stands to gain the most from such a rule. The
NLRA was enacted specifically to protect the worker from inequal-
ity of bargaining and, in the process, to ensure industrial stability."'
The NLRB is entrusted to preserve these goals. 1 7 By allowing the
employees every opportunity to make a free choice as to representa-
tion, stability of the bargaining process and of industry is achieved.
Employer neutrality is seen as the main vehicle to attain the goal."18
As this Comment will illustrate, Telautograph best provides the
means for conforming to the NLRA's objectives.
Though labor law is a dynamic area of substantive law, Dresser is
a case of disregard for established precedent. The line of cases that
leads to Telautograph spanned back some 30 years to Midwest Pip-
ing. Such well-accepted and easily applied decisions should not be so
readily overruled. Indiscriminate changes in the law lend uncertainty
to labor relations where predictability and continuity should prevail.
The increased importance attached to a decertification petition in the
1980s, in light of employee free choice, however, justifies a continued
adherence to the Telautograph rule. Dresser is concerned with the
free choice of representation, but it vastly underestimated how inti-
mately the neutrality guaranteed by Telautograph and this integral
goal of NLRA are linked. Without employer neutrality at all phases
of the decertification process, employee free choice will not be real-
ized." 9 Thus Dresser provides an unneeded and unwarranted change
115. N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 (1962); N.L.R.B. v. Little Rock
Downtowner Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1092 (8th Cir. 1969); Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 184
N.L.R.B. 640 (1971) all state that is an unfair labor practice. But other cases indicate
that unilateral changes can be made if those changes follow a good faith refusal to bar-
gain where necessary to keep the status quo. The granting of wage increases or benefits is
not per se unlawful; the test is whether the increases in wages and benefits are calculated
to impinge upon the employee's freedom of choice in the upcoming election; see, e.g.,
McCormick Longmeadow Stone Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1242 (1966); Marine World
USA, 236 N.L.R.B. 89 (1978); N.L.R.B. v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433
F.2d 1058, 1062 (8th CIr. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971); McGraw-Edison
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 419 F.2d 67, 77 (8th Cir. 1969); Champion Pneumatic Mach. Co., 152
N.L.R.B. 300, 306 (1965).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See also, N.L.R.B. v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d 340,
342 (6th Cir. 1982), enforcing, 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
118. See Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. 892, which stresses this throughout the
opinion. See also, Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
in labor policy that only worsens an already tenuous situation.
Moreover, the Board should not succumb to the pressures applied
by the federal courts of appeal. It is clear that some circuits are
hostile to the Midwest Piping and Telautograph line of cases. In
considering Board decisions on appeal, the circuit courts have often
disagreed explicitly with the NLRB's decisions or have simply not
enforced them. 120 But the NLRB was created by the NLRA to adju-
dicate issues regarding its implementation.12' Members are selected
for their expertise in the field of labor law and are the most qualified
to render a decision. 22 The NLRB must not be deterred from per-
forming its function. Indeed, the NLRB is given authority and defer-
ence to carve out rules that are calculated to effectuate a policy of
the NLRA.12 3 However, a NLRB decision, when marked by a quick
and radical change in the NLRB application of that policy, as oc-
curred in Dresser, particularly when not accompanied by major
changes in NLRB composition, should be viewed critically.
The Practical Effects of the Telautograph Rule Versus the
Dresser Rule
Most importantly, the NLRB's new law in Dresser is both imprac-
tical and unworkable. It appears counterproductive to all that the
NLRB hopes to achieve. If bargaining is forced to take place be-
tween management and the union under circumstances as in Telau-
tograph, that bargaining consists only of "fishbowl" negotiations in
120. See, e.g., Lamment, 578 F.2d 1223; Maywood, 628 F.2d 1; Suburban, 499
F.2d 78.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Because the NLRB draws on a fund of knowledge
all its own in fashioning its remedies under § 10(c) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 160(c)),
its decisions should be afforded special respect by reviewing courts. See Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607
(1966). "[I]t is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substi-
tute their discretion for that of the agency." Id. at 621; see also, Freemont Newspapers,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 436 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1970) (if the remedy carries out the policies of
the NLRA, the reviewing court should defer to the NLRB).
122. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907).
The members of the NLRB in their conclusions "express an intuition of experience
which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions . . . the
[NLRB] was created for the purpose of using its judgment and its knowledge." Id. at
598. See also N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
Justice Frankfurter wrote that
'[c]umulative experience' [of the NLRB members] begets understanding and
insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or qual-
ified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and
fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps
more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process . ...
That competence could not be exercised if in fashioning remedies the adminis-
trative agency were restricted to considering only what was before it in a single
proceeding [as an Article III court is].
Id. at 349.
123. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. at 349 (Frankfurter, J.).
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that whatever negotiations take place are in a controlled and heavily
scrutinized arena. 24
The Effect on the Union
The union is immediately at a disadvantage. The majority repre-
sentative is in retreat because it is aware that at least 30% of the
workers it represents are dissatisfied with the union due to the decer-
tification petition.1 25 This lack of support is critical to the union's
stance in a bargaining session.
Assuming arguendo that the lack of union support is due to an
unfavorable collective bargaining agreement or to a lack of an agree-
ment, the union is forced to quickly try to make amends before the
upcoming election. It knows that the best way to rally support
among the employees is to try to meet their demands. In all likeli-
hood, the employees' demands are much greater than the union itself
would normally demand, and certainly far beyond what the em-
ployer is willing to agree to. But the union, in order to show the
workers that it desires to hold its support, in all probability will
make outrageous, hard-line demands of management merely to keep
the workers happy and demonstrate its commitment to the concerns
of the workers. This is not good faith bargaining because the purpose
of the negotiations as far as the union is concerned is NOT to reach
an agreement, but rather to exhibit its loyalty to the workers. 26
Under these conditions, the union's ability to strike is also af-
fected. If sufficient workers band together and refuse to strike, or to
abort a strike in process, this removes from the union an extremely
potent economic weapon that management must always reckon with
while negotiating. 27 If an employer is aware that this weapon has
124. F. COLEMAN, supra note 45, at 33 (1983). See generally, S. BACHARACH & E.
LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES (1981) for a comprehensive
analysis on the dynamics of the bargaining process.
125. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1987) states that the minimum showing of interest must
be at least 30%.
126. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The court pointed out
that the NLRB acts only to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining while
leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of the parties. The basis is
the NLRB's adherence to the parties' freedom of contract. Id. at 108; see also N.L.R.B.
v. Crockett-Bradley, Inc., 598 F.2d 971, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that a proposal
which is "predictably unacceptable" will not justify an inference of bad faith if the pro-
posal does not foreclose future negotiations); N.L.R.B. v. Wright Motors, Inc. 603 F.2d
604, 608 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that the employer was insisting on an unreasonable
position to avoid negotiating on economic issues and to ensure no bargain through the
tactics of delay).
127. See American Mfg. Concern, 7 N.L.R.B. 753, 759 (1938). The NLRB stated
been diffused by sufficient support of the decertification petition,
then its stance will be much more concrete and its attitude more
aloof. Management might be less willing to bargain in any meaning-
ful manner or to compromise, because the union would have no lev-
erage to reinforce its demands.
However, if the union is able to gather enough support to strike,
the decertification petition will be defeated. 128 An employer will not
be able to rely on the petition because the union will be presumed to
have demonstrated majority support if the workers actually strike.129
Essentially it is viewed as though there was no longer a real question
concerning representation.1 30 Thus, an employer is again obligated to
continue bargaining with the union under either Telautograph or
Dresser.
The Effect on Management
Management, on the other hand, takes a position of extraordinary
strength to the bargaining table. It is aware that the union is in re-
treat and lacks at least 30% support while facing a possible decer-
tification. This gives management an unfair bargaining advantage. It
might be tdo much to expect management to remain completely neu-
tral during this turbulent time. Management will probably set aside
altruistic notions of foregoing its immense advantage in this adver-
sarial setting in order to negotiate the best deal it can achieve."
However, an employer is put in the unenviable position of having
to bargain in good faith while avoiding any possible unlawful ex-
ploitation of the union. No doubt any indiscretions by management
will be used by the retreating union in filing a blocking charge of an
unfair labor practice.1 32 A blocking charge delays the election until
that "a strike exists when a group of employees ceases to work in order to secure compli-
ance with a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or other conditions of employment,
the refusal of which by the employer has given rise to a labor dispute."; see generally, C.
MORRIS, supra note 34, at 995-1033. Though a strike is a deliberate infliction of eco-
nomic harm upon an employer, it is lawful if the strikers are pursuing increased wages,
decreased working hours and improved working conditions. Id. at 995. The strike as a
powerful economic weapon is used with the intent of the employees to return to work
once an agreement is reached. Id. at 995-96.
128. Royal Typewriter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 533 F.2d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 1976).
129. N.L.R.B. v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346, 350-51 (4th Cir. 1962);
N.L.R.B. v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1949) ("it [is] a little
short of absurd for an employer to express a doubt as to representative status of a union
when the majority of the employees had gone on strike under its guidance"); C, MORRIS,
supra note 34, at 357.
130. See, e.g., Preston, 309 F.2d 346; Harris-Woodson, 179 F.2d 720; C. MORIs,
supra note 34, at 357.
131. See White v. N.L.R.B., 255 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1958); 29 U.S.C. §
158(d) stating that the "obligation [to bargain collectively] does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
132. See infra notes 138, 163; but see, Union Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 322 (1948),
enforced, 25 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2303 (5th Cir. 1950) (the mere refusal to accede to a
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the violation is investigated and adjudicated by the NLRB 3 - po-
tentially a long process.
In Dresser, the NLRB stated that an employer with sufficient
proof in the form of additional objective considerations may refuse to
bargain.134 This, however, tends to cloud the issue further. When ob-
jective factors are needed, the standard by which these objective fac-
tors are applied becomes extremely subjective, because it is entirely
left up to the NLRB's discretion whether the employer has relied on
a sufficient number of objective considerations to warrant a refusal
to bargain. 35
An employer making a decision to bargain or not is never quite
sure whether or not it was a correct decision, until the NLRB rules
on the likely responsive blocking charge filed by the union for the
unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain. The NLRB weighs the
factors on a case by case basis, viewing the totality of the circum-
stances, when determining the charge's validity.36 During a delicate
and volatile period such as when a petition for decertification is filed,
before an election is held, stability and predictability are a neces-
sity.137 The rule in Dresser gives no semblance of either. An em-
ployer seemingly has no choice; it must continue to bargain or else
face a charge of an NLRA violation. All of management's options
are removed. Further, an employer might also be in violation of the
NLRA if the employer bargains and unduly exploits his great bar-
gaining advantage.
Moreover, once a blocking charge has been filed, the most obvious
and important losers are the employees who initiated the proceeding
by filing a decertification petition in exercise of their right to choose
representation. 8 The NLRB is obligated to investigate the charge
demand or to recede from a position, is not of itself a refusal to bargain).
133. Normally no election will take place because if the charge is genuine then the
employee would not be able to vote in an atmosphere free of restraint or coercion; see
Gem Int'l, Inc. v. Hendrix, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3302 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (blocking
charge rule is not an abuse of discretion by the Board); Hausley v. N.L.R.B., 81
L.R.R.M. 2254 (BNA) (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (the blocking charge rule does not violate due
process).
134. Dresser, 264 N.L.R.B. 1088.
135. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 41, at 284.
136. See N.L.R.B. v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d (1st Cir. 1981), enforcing 249
N.L.R.B. 412 (1980); see also N.L.R.B. v. Billion Motors, Inc., 700 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.
1983).
137. See C. MORRIS, supra note 34, at 399-405. The importance of conduct during
the time period after the petition has been filled and before the election is analogized to
election conduct where "laboratory conditions" are considered ideal.
138. Employees file the decertification petition as an indicator of at least 30% dis-
to see if it has merit and to determine its effect on the union's sup-
port. 39 However, the bottom line is that there is no quick election
and the workers' attempt to unseat the union is effectively blocked
by the union.
For management, this period between the filing of the petition and
the election is the epitome of "at your risk" bargaining. 140 A decer-
tification petition presents a real question concerning representation,
by indicating dissatisfaction for the majority union.'41 Yet the pre-
sent rule allows the union to camouflage this purpose by thrusting
the employer and its actions into the spotlight, to be scrutinized by
the NLRB due to the blocking charge. This is the wrong focus. In an
RD petition, the focus must necessarily be on the employee-union
relationship. The only relevant actions by the employer should be
those prior to the filing of the petition to determine if they affected
the reason for the union's disaffection. To force the employer to bar-
gain after the petition is filed is to create a chaotic situation result-
ing in an ineffective method of assessing the validity of the petition
itself, since the employer's continued actions greatly facilitate the
union's attempt to block the employee's election. This directly con-
flicts with NLRA stated policy of ensuring employees free choice of
representation . 42
One can reason that any bargaining that takes place as a result of
the rule in Dresser is a waste of time and resources. The air is much
satisfaction. The blocking charge which enjoys increased usage in present day labor law
takes such an extended period of time to settle that the employee's original representa-
tion question gets lost in the shuffle. See, e.g., Rosenthal, Issues in Decertification Pro-
ceedings, PROC. OF NYU 34TH ANN'L NAT'L CONF. ON LABOR 149 (1982). It is not
uncommon for an incumbent union to allege misconduct or improper employer assistance
to block or postpone the decertification election thus presenting another obstacle to the
employees' exercising their right to freely choose their representation. Id. at 158-59.
Irrespective of the outcome of the case, when an employer withdraws recogni-
tion, costs are imposed on employees, the union, and even the employer. Em-
ployees lose because they are deprived of a representative during the years that
litigation may consume. Even if employees oppose the current representative,
operation of the [NLRB's] blocking charge doctrine deprives them of the right
to select another representative or to decertify their representative where the
employer has been charged with unlawfully withdrawing recognition.
Ray, supra note 103, at 272. This Comment asserts that the effect of a blocking charge
is just as devastating to the employees, should an employer not refuse to bargain but
must nevertheless face allegations of unlawful conduct by a union attempting to block
the upcoming election. See also S. SCHOLOSSBER & J. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE
LAW 126 (1983) ("This additional period [of time while the 'blocking' charge is being
investigated] can give the union precious organizing time.").
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
140. Under Dresser, an employer refuses to bargain at his own risk because the
validity of this refusal is not confirmed until the NLRB investigates and adjudicates the
unfair labor practice charge (a § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain) which the union will surely
file. Certainly, this discourages the employer from refusing to bargain except in only the
most definite circumstances, thus limiting the employer's options in collective bargaining.
141. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. at 892.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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too thick with tension and politics to accomplish anything produc-
tive. Additionally, the NLRB has stated that any collective bargain-
ing agreement that is reached during this time becomes null and
void if the union is decertified.143 Therefore, the NLRB's decision in
Dresser forces all parties to engage in a potential exercise in futility.
Theoretically, Dresser was workable. An employer acting in abso-
lute good faith, making all the correct policy and value decisions,
can bargain in neutrality. However, in practice, the bargaining table
pits two adversarial parties against one another. Neither side wants
to give in to the demands of the other. Each wants to strike the best
deal for its party. There often is a winner and a loser. Neutrality is a
contradictory term that cannot be accurately used to describe man-
agement's or the union's posture.
Most importantly, the employee's right to free choice of represen-
tation is not vindicated. After the decertification petition is filed, the
matter is effectively taken from the workers' hands. It becomes a
battle between management and the union. The worker is forced to
take the back seat to unrealistic bargaining, blocking charges, at-
tempts to rally support to strike, and, in all probability, a prolonged
delay of the determination of the original petition's merits. It is
highly unlikely that employee free choice is given anything more
than a passing glance under the Dresser standard.
Because of the potentially disruptive effects of Dresser, the
NLRA's ultimate objective of industrial stability,""' has the slim-
mest of chances of being served. Unrest and disturbances in the la-
bor industry certainly will affect production and the free flow of
commerce on a national level. Dissatisfied employees remain dissatis-
fied. Unions attempt to take whatever actions are necessary to block
the decertification petition, while management is unable to deter-
mine how it should act. This is a futile and chaotic situation.
The Dresser rule is counterproductive to good faith labor manage-
ment relations. The instability created by such a rule taints negotia-
tions to such an extent that the possibility for unethical behavior is
greatly increased, and the representation question might not be de-
cided. Practically, the Dresser rule itself is unsound, and in applica-
tion is completely unworkable.
143. RCA del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. 963; see, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand
Lodge Int'l Assn. of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1954); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n.
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1963) (an unexpired contract is
unenforceable after decertification).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
THE SOLUTION
Conceding that Telautograph is not without its flaws, its method-
ology is the best solution for regulating the period of time immedi-
ately following the filing of a decertification petition. In application,
Telautograph provides a bright line test. If the petition meets all the
NLRB requirements of validity, then the presumption is that there is
a genuine question concerning representation and the employer is re-
quired to refuse to bargain.
The Telautograph decision best fulfills the NLRA's policies of
protecting the employees' free choice of representation, overseeing
the collective bargaining process, and ensuring industrial stability.1 46
The employer is prohibited from bargaining and is thus forced to
remain neutral. 47 All unnecessary allegations of unfair labor prac-
tices or blocking charges based on post-filing actions can be avoided.
The union is not allowed to construe the employer's acts after the
filing of the petition as attempts to undermine the union's majority,
so that it can file a blocking charge. By utilizing the Telautograph
rule, the focus is on the union and its majority representation. Ap-
propriately, the focus is diverted from the employer's actions. 148
The Telautograph rule also provides workers with the best oppor-
tunity to make a free choice regarding representation. All sides can
concentrate on the upcoming election to determine this important
question. Thus, the employees are able to avoid having their atten-
tion drawn away from what the real issue which is - whether they
want the union to continue to represent them in light of their dissat-
isfaction. The workers are not distracted by union tactics to delay or
avoid an election. The issue becomes more complicated when an em-
ployer must bargain. Many wheels are set in motion. Uncertainty
abounds. The union is able to divert the attention of the employees
to the management and away from the representation issue. The
bargaining itself is useless since the chances are great that an agree-
ment will not be reached; even if one is reached, it might become
null and void.4 9
The break in bargaining while the NLRB resolves the question
presented by the petition is a small price to pay for the attainment of
145. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. at 893-94.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
147. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. 892. See also, Traub's Mkt., 205 N.L.R.B. at
790. Chairman Miller (concurring) stated that under Telautograph, an employer "need
fear no harassment through any 8(a)(5) proceeding, nor will prompt action on the elec-
tion petition be delayed by any such charge, because we have now made clear that our
Regional Offices should promptly dismiss, as unmeritorious, any such charge and proceed
promptly to process the election petition." Id.
148. Telautograph, 199 N.L.R.B. 892; Traub's Mkt., 205 N.L.R.B. 787.
149. See RCA del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. 963; Modine, 216 F.2d 326; Retail
Clerks, 316 F.2d 754.
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more stable bargaining relationships and the avoidance of industrial
strife. The importance of settling the crucial question of representa-
tion far outweighs the limited suspension of bargaining activity. Fur-
ther, the waiting period between the filing of the petition, and the
hearing/election is sufficiently short to ensure that any break in bar-
gaining will only represent a minor inconvenience, if the incumbent
union wins the election.150 If the union loses, then the employees'
rights would be vindicated. The union would be ousted and the em-
ployees free to represent themselves or to elect a new representative.
To not allow the petition to be resolved only highlights the employ-
ees' helplessness and inequality of bargaining.
According to recent trends, each year the number of decertifica-
tion petitions filed which result in an election is increasing;""1 as is
the percentage of those elections lost by the unions. 52 This presents
a unique situation. For the last five years, unions have lost approxi-
mately 75% of all decertification elections. Sa This indicates 1) a
trend toward deunionization; and 2). a growing feeling of dissatisfac-
tion with union representation.'" It is then clear, that a valid decer-
150. A matter of weeks is substantially less than a two year period possibly re-
quired to resolve an unfair labor practice charge which "will surely be filled by the
union" in the face of any refusal to bargain not supported by a rule such as Telauto-
graph. F. COLEMAN, supra note 45, at 133.
151. See M. SANDVER, LABOR RELATIONS: PROCESS AND OUTCOMES (1987). These
878 elections represented 19% of all NLRB supervised elections for the year.
By way of contrast, during the 1960s there was an average of about 250 decer-
tifications per year; during the 1970s there was an average of 560 decertifica-
tions per year. During the 1980s the average will probably be around 880 or
900 per year. Of even greater significance, however, is the fact that in the
1960s and 1970s decertification elections amounted to a small percentage of
the NLRB's election volume - always less than 10 percent. Today the per-
centage of decertification elections is 19 percent of the NLRB's caseload and
the 31,210 workers in the decertified units represent a sizable number of lost
potential members. No longer can unions view decertification elections as a
minor burden. (emphasis added). Id. at 236.
Cf. F. COLEMAN, supra note 45, at 9-10. See also, Rosenthal, Issues in Decertification
Proceedings, PROC OF NYU 34TH ANN'L NAT'L CONF. ON LABOR 149, 150-53 (1982).
152. See M. SANDVER, supra note 151, at 236 (1987). See also F. COLEMAN,
supra note 45, at 9-10.
153. M. SANDVER, supra note 151, at 110.
154. See Freeman, Why Are Unions Fairing Poorly in NLRB Representation
Elections?, in T. KOCHAN, CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR
(1985); see also F. COLEMAN, supra note 45.
An employee might want to deunionize to:
- Represent himself directly with management without 3rd party
intervention.
- Obtain greater opportunity for advancement by eliminating restrictive se-
niority rules.
- Free himself from union discipline and sanctions, such as fines.
tification petition filed by union employees, even though only a mini-
mum showing of 30% interest is required, does present a real
question concerning representation, not merely that only 30% of the
unit employees are dissatisfied. 55 Indeed, to put it into proper per-
spective, in all cases involving unblocked petitions that a union rea-
sonably believes it might win, elections have been held; and, in an
overwhelmingly 75 % of those elections, the employees voted that the
union discontinue its representation. 56
Moreover, the figures for the percentage of lost elections could,
even be higher than reported. 157 Most recent figures demonstrate
that of 1,904 filed petitions, only 922 went to an actual election. 158
Many elections do not even take place; if the union feels it will lose,
it will withdraw from the unit.159 Also many elections are blocked by
charges of unfair labor practices which may or may not turn out to
be meritorious, 6 ° but which, if investigated, serve to delay an elec-
- Eliminate the expense of union dues, initiation fees, special assessments,
and other periodic levies.
- Avoid the favoritism, political infighting, and factionalism that often
marks local, regional, and national bureaucractic union structure.
- Enhance job security by improving the employer's competitive position.
- Put an end to strikes and other work disruptions caused by a union.
Id. at 11.
155. The Dresser decision is thus incorrect in its assertion that "[O]n its face, the
[decertification] petition indicates nothing more than the disaffection of a minority of
unit employees . . . [and] in no way reflects ... the sentiment of the unit majority."
Dresser, 264 N.L.R.B. at 1088. Recent data indicates that the decertification petition is
merely evidence of the tip of the iceberg. That unions lose 75% of the decertification
petitions that go to election demonstrates that many more unit employees support the
petition than the 30% minimum filing requirement of the NLRB. In modern age, it is to
ignore reality and the entire deunionization trend to not treat simply the filing of a decer-
tification petition by employees (an RD petition) as a genuine question concerning repre-
sentation deserving of investigation by the NLRB and an election by the employees as
soon as possible. This Comment asserts that the Telautograph rule provides the speed
and atmosphere that is a necessity to achieve the goals and policies under the NLRA.
156. See supra notes 151-53.
157. This would occur assuming that unions were restricted in their blocking
charge usage and stayed at the workplace for the election even in futile situations where
it would certainly lose. Unions will usually voluntarily withdraw to save time and expense
if it is sure it will lose the election. The actual percentage could be as high as 80-85 %
assuming these losses are factored in. See generally, R. LEWIS & W. KRUPMAN, WIN-
NING NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGEMENT'S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 127-
29 (1979). See also infra note 159.
158. 48 NLRB ANN. REP. (1986) (this report published by the NLRB reveals data
for fiscal year ending September 30, 1983). See also Krupman & Rasin, supra note 34,
at 231. Figures from 1977 indicate that of 1,867 filed petitions, only 849 went to an
actual ele ction.
159. Krupman & Rasin, supra note 34, at 231-32.
160. Id. Filing a charge of unfair labor practice against an employer is said to
block the petition because it is the policy of the NLRB to withhold processing of RD
petitions when a charge has been levied, since there is a possibility that employees' sec-
tion 7 rights were interfered with. This is a very effective device. Id. at 232. However, the
union must allege unlawful acts other than mere refusal to bargain in order to stay the
petition. The NLRB then addresses the unfair labor practice charge thereby blocking the
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tion. Therefore, it is even more urgent for the election to take place
since employee dissatisfaction with union representation might be
more widespread than raw figures actually indicate.'' This illus-
trates a great trend among employees to deunionize.
Thus, it is imperative that employees, now more than at any time
in the past, have an unbridled opportunity to exercise their free
choice in deciding not only which union they want to represent them,
but even more basically, whether they desire to be represented at all.
Ultimately, this employee free choice will lead to industrial stability.
For the NLRB to force bargaining during this time prevents the em-
ployees from making this choice.
Clearly, a present day employee-filed decertification petition raises
serious doubts as to the union's continued majority status, and
should be given substantially more deference and weight in situa-
tions where no pre-filihg unfair labor charges have been levied. The
employees have taken the initiative and organized themselves in a
show of dissatisfaction for the incumbent union.'6 2 The data illus-
trate that elections, to be accurate, must be held in the most neutral
and sterile atmosphere possible. This neutral atmosphere is best ef-
fectuated by application of the Telautograph rule. Maintaining the
status quo should be of crucial importance. During this status quo
period, energy can be spent by both management and the union in
rallying support for their sides, as a means to the end of a concrete
resolution to the paramount representation question.
CONCLUSION
The Telautograph rule, which states that when a petition for
decertification is timely filed by an employee or his or her represen-
tative, an employer may refuse to bargain with the challenged union,
provides the best means for resolving a question concerning represen-
tation from a decertification petition. It is doubtful that in most
cases the representation question will even be addressed under the
Dresser rule, permitting continued bargaining even while the repre-
sentative issue is outstanding.
In supporting and implementing NLRA policies of neutrality, em-
petition. Id. at 238.
161. See supra note 157.
162. This is in contrast to situations where two competing unions are striving for
initial certification or where a rival union is challenging an incumbent union or even
where an employer has initiated the decertification process (an RM petition).
ployee free choice, and industrial stability,163 it is important that an
appropriate rule maintain the status quo, so that no action after the
filing of the decertification petition can change the events that origi-
nally led to the petition being filed by the employees."" Bargaining
collectively during this period may serve to be an artificial and im-
penetrable barrier to the ultimate goal of resolution of the represen-
tation question and employee free choice of representation.
This Comment submits that the NLRB should reverse Dresser"
5
and change back to its previous rule in Telautograph.66 The NLRB
should also structure its decertification election procedure in order to
ensure that the petition is handled as quickly and efficiently as possi-
ble. In order to prevent bargaining discontinuity and management or
union interference, a hearing and election must take place soon after
the filing of the decertification petition. Additionally, the NLRB
must make all efforts to certify the election results without delay.
The decertification petition has taken on increased importance in the
labor force in the last five years. To adjust to this trend, the NLRB
must shed its unrealistic rule in Dresser 67 and opt for a standard
that is pragmatic and time-proven. This Comment asserts that the
best manner to effectuate the NLRB policies is to return to the Tel-
autograph rule, thus creating a necessary exception to the usual bar-
gaining obligations created when an employee-initiated decertifica-
tion petition is filed with the NLRB. The rule in Telautograph
should be limited to situations where an employer refuses to bargain
in the face of a genuine question concerning representation, and not
when the employer wants to withdraw recognition entirely from the
union majority representation.16 8
TIMOTHY SILVERMAN
163. Pennco, 684 F.2d at 342; see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
164. Dresser, 264 N.R.L.B. at 1089 states that the status quo should be "contin-
ued bargaining" yet this Comment illustrates that any bargaining subsequent to the fil-
ing of a decertification petition by employees causes a deterioration of the bargaining
relationship, industrial instability, and a chilling of the employees' right to a free choice
of representation.
165. 264 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982).
166. 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).
167. 264 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
